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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

TERRY L. HAY,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 900457

Priority No, 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of criminal
homicide, murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (amended 1991).l
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

defendant's motion for a mistrial based on ineffective assistance
of trial counsel, allegedly resulting from trial counsel's
failure to introduce the victim's knife into evidence?
When raised on appeal after trial court proceedings on
the issue, the question of trial counsel effectiveness is a mixed

1

Although section 76-5-203 has since been amended to
delete the "second degree" classification (this level of criminal
homicide is now simply called "murder"), the State will refer to
the offense as "murder in the second degree," in accord with the
language of the statute in effect at the time of defendant's
prosecution.

one of law and fact.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

697-98 (1984) (review following habeas corpus proceeding); State
v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (reviewing denial of
new trial motion).

Defendant must show both that counsel's

performance was deficient and that such deficiency was
prejudicial to defendant.
2.

Templin, 805 P.2d at 186.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

defendant's motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial
misconduct?
This issue has not been properly preserved for review.
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Utah 1989); State v. Cobb,
774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989) (grounds for an objection must be
specifically and distinctly stated in the trial court before this
Court will review such claim on appeal).
3.

Did trial counsel's failure to object to allegedly

gruesome evidence constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?
Where first raised on appeal, the question of
effectiveness of trial counsel is one of law, in that only the
record of the original trial is examined.
818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991).

State v. Humphries,

Defendant must show both that

counsel's performance was deficient and that such deficiency was
prejudicial to defendant.

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186

(Utah 1990).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with criminal homicide, murder in
the second degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990), including a firearm enhancement
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990) (R. 6-7).
Following a four day jury trial defendant was convicted
as charged (R. 167).
The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of five
years to life in the young adult facility at the Utah State
Prison, which sentence was to run concurrent with an additional
one year, firearm enhancement term (R. 223).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

Victim's Body Discovered

Responding to a tip from some rabbit hunters on
December 31, 1989, Detective Scott Carter, of the Utah County
Sheriff's Office, investigated the discovery of a "skeletonized
body" in a remote area near Utah Lake (Transcript of Jury Trial,
July 10, 1990 [Tl.] 22). The corpse was discovered lying on top
of a sleeping bag, on top of a wood board, dressed in "biker
shorts," Levi's and a single black cowboy boot on the left foot
(Tl. 25-27).

A sock containing the remains of the right foot was

3

located on top of the torso, near the shoulders (Transcript of
Jury Trial, July 13, 1990 [T4.] at 534).
B.

Autopsy Indicates Homicide

Dr. Sharon Schnittker, an assistant director for the
Utah State Medical Examiner, autopsied the unidentified corpse on
January 1, 1990 (Transcript of Jury Trial, July 11, 1990 [T2.] at
201).

Dr. Schnittker recovered two bullets from within the skull

cap and observed two entrance wounds slightly to the right of the
middle back of the skull (T2. 202). From the beveling of the
entrance wounds, Dr. Schnittker was able to determine the bullet
trajectories were "slightly from right to left . . . and slightly
downward toward [ the ] feet,f (T2. 206). Dr. Schnittker further
determined "that the muzzle of the gun held by the shooter [came]
from the back of the decedent, pointing toward the front of the
decedent, so [that the bullets entered] the back of the head"
(T2. 208). Based on these estimations, and the positioning of
the entrance wounds (within five/eighths of an inch of each
other), Dr. Schnittker determined that at the time the shots were
fired the victim's head was "lying on the ground, or in some way
in a fixed position" (T2. 219). Thus, it was "most likely [that]
the victim was lying down and the shooter standing over the
victimf,]" and the victim's head was either "face down
completely, or turned slightly to the right" (T2. 220).
Additionally, Dr. Schnittker discovered a separate
fracture, unconnected to the bullet wounds, on the right side of
the skull, along the upper eyebrow ridge or zygoma, and the
4
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When Lony's grandmother asked him where Lony was, defendant said
that he was up in Wales Canyon, "getting their dinner" (T2. 246).
Defendant then went inside the Crosby's trailer and collected the
rest of his things (T2. 247). When Lony's grandmother asked him
how he intended to get back up the mountain with all of his
stuff, defendant told her that Lony was going to meet him halfway
(T2. 247). Defendant then took off toward the mountain (T2.
247).

Neither Mr. or Mrs. Crosby saw defendant or Lony again

(T2. 247).
When defendant returned to Salt Lake City on August 1,
1989, the first person he visited was Lony's girlfriend, Jennifer
Bratt, whom defendant had also dated (T2. 270). He arrived at
Jennifer's house between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. (T2. 270). When
Jennifer asked him where Lony was, defendant told her that Lony
had hit him over the head with a rock and left, taking the gun
and their knives (T2. 270). Jennifer, who saw no sign of injury,
reached to feel the bump on defendant's head, but he would not
let her touch it (T2. 271). Defendant speculated that Lony had
gone to Reno to be with his ex-girlfriend (T2. 271).
Jennifer saw defendant again the next day at school and
again asked where Lony was (T2. 272). Defendant told her that he
had talked to Lony and that Lony had hitchhiked to Reno (T2.
272).

Jennifer and defendant remained good friends and began to

date seriously on September 17, 1990 (T2. 273). Almost every day
defendant told Jennifer that he loved her (T2. 273). Although
they talked about Lony often, and defendant told Jennifer that
6
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Prior to traveling to Wales with Lony, defendant had
told Jennifer that he didn't like the way Lony treated her, and
that she was crazy to go back to him (T2. 309). Defendant also
sent her flowers and asked Jennifer not to go back tc • Lony (T2
309),
Additionally, a t trial, defendant denied developing a
romantic interest in Jennifer until approximately one month after
the homicide (T3. 439, 467). However, when asked by the
prosecutor, defendant admitted it was possible he had written
Jennifer a letter before the homicide in which he declared:
1 wisl I 1 could only tell you how much I ] • ::: v e
you.
I have always waited for the right
girl, and I found her. But I tried to tell
you you're the one, you're the one. It's so
hard to say it to you because you're so sweet
and heartful [sic].
. Well, better stop
and let you do your school work. Remember
I'll always love you no matter what. I just
wish I could see you every day, but someday
soon I'll be back and hopefully, we'll be , .
• able to go out for a little bit. I'll
always wait for you and I hope you'll do the
same. Well, got to go. P.S.: Don't tell
nobody, please. I love you more than words
could say. Love you, S3 i ck
Love, Terry.
(T3.

495-96).

inquired if defendant had heard from Lony and defendant replied
that he had talked to Lony on the phone and that Lony was in Reno
(T3. 403).
Lois Crosby, Lony's mother, talked to defendant later
on the morning of August 2, 1989 (T3. 318). When Mrs. Crosby
asked where her son was, defendant said he didn't know (T3. 319).
Defendant told her that while they were camping, Lony started
acting strangely and talking about thumbing to Wisconsin (T3.
320).

Mrs. Crosby asked why her son would go to Wisconsin and

defendant said he didn't know, but promised that he would find
him (T3. 320, 334). Mrs. Crosby observed that defendant was a
little nervous, but mostly tired and sunburned (T3. 320).
Defendant called Mrs. Crosby at approximately 2:30 p.m.
and said that Lony had been seen in Mapleton, Utah, the night
before in a big white truck, and that he had been saying good-bye
to the people he knew there (T3. 320-21).
Defendant stopped by the Crosby home again around 5:30
p.m. (T3. 321). He "was smoking a lot of cigarettes, being
shaky, kind of moving up and down out of his chair, crying, just
very, very —

kind of fell apart deal [sic]" (T3. 321).

Defendant told Mrs. Crosby that he "took a nap, and when he woke
up Lony was gone.

He just —

poof —

disappeared" (T3. 321).

Lony's father similarly observed that defendant was visibly
shaken (T3. 337). "He would stand up and sit down a lot, moved
[sic] his hands across the table and was chain smoking" (T3.
337).

Mrs. Crosby asked whether they had gotten into a fight and
8

defendant said they had, but she observed no signs of injury on
him (T3. 322).
After talking to defendant on the evening of August 2f
1989, Lony's father contacted Paul Reich, a Deputy Salt Lake
County Sheriff (T3. 338). Officer Reich interviewed defendant
that same night at the Crosby residence (T3. 340). Defendant
told Officer Reich that it was approximately 6:00 p.m. when he
and Lony got up the mountain and that he took a nap (T3. 342).
When he awakened at approximately 7:15 p.m., defendant claimed
that Lony was gone (T3. 342). Additionally, defendant told the
officer that he and Lony had been friends for a long time and
that they had had no problems on the trip (T3. 342).
Officer Reich spoke with defendant again approximately
one-half hour later at defendant's home (T3. 342). Defendant
first stuck by his original story (T3. 343). However, when
Officer Reich informed defendant that he didn't think his story
made sense, defendant broke down and became very emotional (T3.
343).

With tears in his eyes, defendant told Officer Reich that

he had promised Lony "not to tell, . . . and didn't want to break
his promise to Lony, . . . not to tell where [Lony] was or what
he was doing" (T3. 343). Defendant then told the officer that
Lony had run away to Nevada where he was going to get a job (T3.
344).

Defendant also told Officer Reich that they had stolen a

truck to return from Wales, and that he had last seen Lony when
he dropped him off at the Draper exit on 1-15, at approximately
12200 South (T3. 344).

9

Over the course of the next several months, defendant
continued to represent that he was in touch with Lony and that
Lony was well. Mrs. Crosby called defendant approximately two or
three times a day to see if had heard from Lony (T3. 323, 332).
Defendant told her that Lony had called him twice and was doing
fine, and that he had asked Lony to call her (T3. 323). However,
defendant never told Mrs. Crosby where her son was (T3. 323).
Although defendant agreed to assist the Crosbys in a search of
the Wales area, he failed to show up at the time of the search,
which was conducted two weeks after Lony's disappearance (T3.
324).
A mutual friend of defendant and Lony, Kendall Davis,
was present on one occasion when Mrs. Crosby telephoned (T3. 38889).

Kendall observed how upset the call made defendant and felt

badly for him (T3. 392). Defendant said, "If somebody would call
them, or something like that, to —

you know, just let them know

that you talked to him, because they trust you.
you" (T3. 388-89).

They believe

Although he had not talked to Lony since his

disappearance, Kendall subsequently made such a call on
defendant's behalf (T3. 389).
Detective Peter Godfrey of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office interviewed defendant as part of his
investigation of Lony's disappearance (T3. 406, 408). Defendant
repeated essentially the same story he had told Officer Reich and
Lony's family and friends about Lony going to Reno (T3. 406-09).
Detective Godfrey contacted several motels in Reno, but found no
10

record of Lony (T3. 408). Additionally, defendant told Detective
Godfrey that he dropped the stolen truck off at 4500 South and
then contacted the authorities as to its location (T3. 410).
C.

Defendant Suspected

After reviewing police reports surrounding Lony's
disappearance, Detective Carter began to suspect defendant in the
homicide and brought him in for questioning on January 2, 1990
(Tl. 28-29).

Defendant said he had known Lony for about 10 years

and that he and Lony had gone camping in Wales, Utah in late July
1989 (Tl. 32). They stayed at Lony's grandparent's trailer where
they performed odd jobs and went rabbit hunting (Tl. 32).
Defendant told the detective that he and Lony stole a truck for
their return trip to Salt Lake City on August 1, 1992 (Tl. 33).
According to defendant, they exited 1-15 at 90th South and Lony,
who had "family problems," said he didn't want to go home, so
defendant left him there, near an empty field (Tl. 33). When
Detective Carter informed defendant that his story was
inconsistent with other facts he had uncovered, defendant "slid
down in his chair[,] sobbed," and confessed that he was
responsible for Lony's death (Tl. 35).
1. Defendant Claims the Homicide Occurred in
Murray, Utah
Defendant told Detective Carter that after he and Lony
returned from Wales, they decided to camp out in an empty field
near Lony's parents home in Murray, Utah (Tl. 35). They set up a
camp with their sleeping bags and were sitting around talking
when they got into an argument over Jennifer (Tl. 37). Defendant
11

claimed that Lony confronted him with the fact that defendant had
slept with Jennifer and then came at him with a knife (Tl. 37).
Defendant reached for his rifle, pointed it at Lony, and it
discharged (Tl. 37). When asked for more details, defendant said
he could not remember "the exact way" the shooting occurred or
where the bullets hit Lony; however, he did recall that Lony was
about 10 feet away at the time (Tl. 37-38).

He further recalled

that after the gun went off, Lony fell to the ground (Tl. 38).
According to defendant, he then fled to his parent's
house to get his father's truck (Tl. 39). He parked the truck
approximately 75 feet away from Lony's house and then pulled
Lony's body on a sleeping bag to the truck where he lifted it
into the back (Tl. 40). Defendant used the wood racks off the
side of the truck to cover the body (Tl. 40). Defendant then
drove to Utah County where he dumped Lony's body near Utah Lake
(Tl. 41).
Following defendant's explanation for the homicide,
Detective Carter turned him over to Murray City Detective, Jeff
Anderson, for further questioning (Tl. 48-49).

Detective

Anderson interviewed defendant in the early morning hours of
January 3, 1990 (Tl. 69-70).

At that time, defendant appeared

alert and responsive, but somewhat quiet and depressed (Tl. 71).
Defendant told Detective Anderson that he and Lony had driven a
four wheel ATV as far as Mapleton, Utah, and then hitchhiked the
rest of the way to Wales (Tl. 71). He said they returned from
Wales in a truck on either July 31, 1989, or August 1, 1989 (Tl.
12

72).

According to defendant, he parked the truck on 4500 South,

by the Jordan Queen, and left Lony there while he went over to
Jennifer's house to let her know they were back (Tl. 72-73).
When defendant returned to the truck, he and Lony gathered their
belongings and walked to a field near the Crosby home located at
approximately 4850 South, 400 West, just north of the Galleria
(Tl. 73).
Defendant claimed that he and Lony put their sleeping
bags down, talked about getting some beer and eventually walked
to a nearby Circle K where they stole a case of beer off of a
delivery truck (Tl. 74). After they had each drunk 11 cans of
beer, defendant said he and Lony began to talk about Jennifer,
and Lony got "extremely violent and upset" (Tl. 75). Lony
started "yelling and screaming," and "grabbed" a knife from his
backpack (Tl. 75-76).

Defendant claimed that Lony started coming

towards him, making verbal threats and swinging his knife within
two feet of him (Tl. 76-77).

Defendant grabbed his rifle, a .22

caliber semi-automatic and held it at his hip with the barrel
pointed upwards (Tl. 77, 188-89).

Defendant claimed the rifle

discharged because his fingers were shaking (Tl. 77, 188-89).
According to defendant, Lony swung the knife, stumbled and spun
before he fired (Tl. 192). After the shooting, defendant noted
that Lony had fallen to the ground motionless (Tl. 79).
Defendant called Lony's name, but received no response (Tl. 79).
Scared and frightened, defendant said he wanted to hide Lony's
body, and to run away from it (Tl. 143). Defendant claimed that
13

the rifle was loaded because they had been rabbit hunting (Tl.
194).
Additionally, defendant told Detective Anderson that
after dumping Lony's body near Utah Lake he returned to Murray
and threw Lony's backpack and the knife Lony had threatened him
with in a nearby creek (Tl. 81). He described Lony's knife as
having a 12 inch long fixed blade with a black and red handle
(Tl. 81). Defendant subsequently took Murray City detectives to
the field where he claimed the homicide occurred and, while the
officers videotaped the scene, attempted to demonstrate what had
happened (Tl. 84)
2. Evidence that the Homicide Occurred in
Wales, Utah
At the request of Detective Anderson, Arlene Crosby
searched the area near her Wales, Utah home, where she believed
Lony and defendant had camped (T2. 248). During that search she
found a cowboy boot, in a bush, 2-3 feet off the ground (T2. 24950).
Detective Anderson traveled to Wales to investigate the
boot on January 9, 1990 (Tl. 84-85).

The back of the boot, which

was similar to the boot found with Lony's body, had been opened
from the heel up, with a smooth edge (Tl. 102-03, T2. 154-55).
As part of his investigation, Detective Anderson also searched
the foothills west of the Crosby residence where he found two .22
casings and a knife (Tl. 84-85, 88). He also observed a shallow
hole, covered with broken branches (Tl. 92).
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D.

Defendant's Story

At trial, for the first time, defendant admitted that
the homicide had actually occurred in Wales, Utah (T3. 446).
Defendant claimed that he told Detectives Carter and Anderson
that the shooting occurred in Murray because he "didn't want to
be around them (the officers)," and because "that's where we both
lived.

I just didn't want to believe it, so I just, you know,

thought of something and said it" (T3. 466).
1.

Defendant Claims He Acted in Self defense

According to defendant's trial testimony, he and Lony
headed up Wales canyon after having lunch with Lony's
grandparents on August 1, 1989 (T3. 441). They took sleeping
bags, backpacks, defendant's gun and their knives (T3. 441).
They each had two knives, one they kept in their individual
pockets and one they kept in their individual backpacks (T3.
441).

According to defendant they intended to use his gun to

shoot some rabbits for dinner (T3. 442).
When they arrived at the campsite, defendant claimed
that he went looking for food while Lony dug a fire pit (T3.
442).

When defendant returned to the campsite, he and Lony began

to talk about Jennifer (T3. 443). According to defendant, Lony
said something about wishing Jennifer were there for "sexual
purposes," and he (defendant) just "chuckled" (T3. 443-444).
Defendant further claimed that they were "just sitting there"
when "Lony jumped and said[,] 'I can't believe you did it'" (T3.
443).

Defendant "looked at him, [and] told him, . . . 'Well, you
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know, it's over, you know.

Forget about it, it's past tense'"3

(T3. 443). Lony then "got in his bag and grabbed a knife," and
"said that he wanted to kill [him]" (T3. 443, 446). Defendant
claimed that he picked up his gun "just to scare [Lony] off and
frighten him and make him stop" (T3. 445). Defendant said Lony
"swung the knife once," then he "went into a spin, into a fall, .
. . and the next thing you know, the gun goes off" (T3. 446).
Defendant claimed his hands were "shaking" as he held the gun and
that he "didn't know what to do" (T3. 447). He estimated that
Lony was two feet away at the time he shot him, but he didn't
"pay attention" to Lony's position when he fell (T3. 447).
Additionally, he claimed to remember firing only one shot (T3.
448).
After the shooting, defendant observed that "Lony was
laying [sic] down on the ground and [defendant] hollered at him
once and [Lony] didn't move" (T3. 448). Defendant "picked up the
bottom of the sleeping bag and drug [sic] it over to Lony, and
dug this [sic] hole" (T3. 448). He then "moved [Lony's body]
over to that [sic] hole, . . . and kicked dirt over it," because
he "didn't want to see it" (T3. 448). Although defendant claimed
that Lony dug the pit to cook their dinner, it was approximately
five feet long, three feet wide and one foot deep (T3. 484).

3

Defendant believed Lony was referring to the fact that
he had slept with Jennifer (T3. 436-438). Although defendant
never talked to Lony about the fact that he had slept with
Jennifer (T3. 438), defendant was aware that Jennifer had told
Lony about the incident (T3. 436-437).
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Defendant claimed that he "didn't pay no attention" to
where he shot Lony (T3. 483), and never looked to see where the
bullets were in Lony's body (T3. 448). Additionally, even though
Lony wore his hair closely shaved (T3. 484), and fell on his
stomach after the shooting (T3. 483)/ defendant claimed he never
observed the bullet wounds in the back of Lony's head (T3. 48384).

Nor did he notice any blood (T3. 504).
After dumping Lony's body in the pit, defendant

gathered up their camping gear and "threw" the knife and "some
other things" as he ran down the hill (T3. 449). Defendant did
not recall talking to Lony's grandmother, but admitted that it
could have happened (T3. 450). He did recall stealing a truck
and driving to Salt Lake City where he arrived shortly before
dark (T3. 451). Defendant hid Lony's things in a barn behind
Lony's house where he spent the night (T3. 452).
2.

Defendant Refuses to Believe that Lony is Dead

Defendant explained that he had lied to Lony's family
and friends about Lony's whereabouts because "[he] didn't want to
believe that Lony was dead" (T3. 454). Rather, he wanted to
believe "that Lony did leave [sic]f [that] he went to Reno or
someplace.
456).

I wanted to believe that he was still alive" (T3.

In the months following the homicide and before the

discovery of Lony's remains, defendant claimed that he never
thought about the shooting, rather "[he] just thought Lony was
out of town, [that] he went to Reno" (T3. 464).
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Defendant said he returned to the scene of the shooting
approximately six weeks later, in the middle of the night, "to
prove to [himself] that it didn't happen" (T3. 457). He
described seeing the sleeping bag, picking it up and carrying it
down to his father's truck (T3. 458, 491). Although Lony's
decomposed body was resting on top of the sleeping bag, defendant
did not acknowledge looking at or otherwise noticing its
decomposed state (T3. 458-59, 488, 491, 504). Rather, he
persisted in his belief that the shooting had not occurred (T3.
458).

Defendant further claimed that he "[didn't know] and

"didn't pay no attention" to whether Lony's right foot came off
when he attempted to move the body to Utah Lake (T3. 489).
Although the homicide occurred in Sanpete County,
defendant was prosecuted in Salt Lake County, based on his
representations, prior to trial, that the homicide had occurred
in Murray, Utah (Tl. 6).
Other evidence will be discussed as it is pertinent to
specific points.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of
trial counsel.

Although trial counsel's conduct was arguably

deficient in failing to introduce the victim's knife during
trial, defendant's theory of self defense was adequately
presented to the jury.

Additionally, the victim's knife was

ultimately presented to the jury during their deliberations,
along with defendant's theory of its importance as corroborative
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of his version of the homicide.

Thus, defendant has failed to

demonstrate any unfair prejudice.
As for defendant's assertion that the prosecutor
concealed and withheld the victim's knife in violation of due
process, it is complete speculation, devoid of record support and
should be rejected.

Moreover, the issue has not been properly

preserved for review.
Finally, defendant was not denied the effective
assistance of trial counsel when counsel failed to object to
allegedly improper cross-examination by the prosecutor.

Although

the trial court had previously cautioned the parties to avoid the
gruesome aspects of defendant's movement of the victim's corpse,
it became necessary for the prosecutor to confront defendant with
the arguably gruesome realities of his actions when defendant
alleged that he did not believe the victim was dead, even after
having moved the decomposing corpse from the homicide scene to
Utah Lake.

Moreover, even without the arguably gruesome

testimony, the jury had substantial evidence from which to infer
that defendant was not credible, and that his version of events
was inconsistent with the physical evidence.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT TRIAL
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO INTRODUCE THE VICTIM'S
KNIFE INTO EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL DEPRIVED HIM
OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL; NOR
HAS HE ESTABLISHED ANY PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
A.

Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Defendant alleges that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not offer the
victim's knife into evidence during trial (Br. of App. at 10-13).
Apparently, trial counsel was operating under the assumption that
the victim's knife had not been discovered and was therefore
unavailable (Transcript of Jury Trial, July 13, 1990 [T4.] at
576).

However, after the jury was excused to deliberate, trial

counsel observed the victim's knife in the prosecutor's briefcase
and brought the matter to the attention of the trial court with a
motion for a mistrial (T4. 592). In so moving, trial counsel
acknowledged that she may have been apprised of the knife's
existence through discovery (T4. 592-93).

If so, trial counsel

indicated that she was
simply rais[ing] the issue for appeal
purposes on the grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel, because in [her]
obvious haste to prepare for the trial . . .
[she] did not catch the fact that that knife
existed, which would [have corroborated her]
client's story.
(T4. 593). Trial counsel further clarified that she was "not
alleging that [the State] hid [the knife] from [her]" (T4. 594).
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In considering trial counsel's motion, the court
suggested that the parties stipulate to the knife's admission
(T4. 597). Trial counsel urged the court to grant her mistrial
motion, but acknowledged that if the court had determined to deny
the motion, she preferred that the matter be cured by stipulation
(T4. 597). The court indicated that it would not grant the
motion for mistrial "unless there's [sic] good ground for it,
[a]nd if there's [sic] a way to cure things, there's [sic] not
good ground for a mistrial" (T4. 598).
The parties ultimately came up with a stipulation in
which each party briefly stated the knife's "significance" to
their individual theories of the case (T4. 600-01).

Prior to the

court reading the stipulation to the deliberating jurors, trial
counsel again expressed her concern that "it would have been a
lot more effective if [she] could have asked [defendant] to
identify [the knife], if [she] could have argued and gone on and
on about the credibility, just to that extent" (T4. 602). The
court responded that
[n]o one is entitled to a perfect trial.
Everyone is entitled to a fair trial. And in
fact the way this has occurred may have been
much more effective for your client than any
other way. The jury is going to look upon it
as something they never expected, either
manna from heaven or elsewhere, and I think
it could well be more effective in your
behalf because of the stipulation of the
parties and my consideration of it.
(T4. 602). The court then read the following stipulation to the
jurors:
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Members of the jury, we're going to do
something a little bit out of the ordinary.
I'm going to, at this time, receive Exhibits
42 and 43. 43 is a knife; 42 is a map of the
area of search [sic], or the area that we
have been talking about in Sanpete County,
with a designation of 42 on the map, with a
red "X" in the lower left-hand side of the
map indicating where the knife, Exhibit 43,
was found.
There was a knife in existence and
neither party established foundation for its
admissibility into evidence during the trial
proper. Both parties have agreed, however,
that the knife should be admitted at this
time for consideration by the jury in its
deliberations. It's a knife with a black
handle trimmed in red, found in late August
or early September 1989, and marked as
Exhibit 43-S by a member of the Sanpete
Search and Rescue organization, and found, as
I indicated, at a place designated by the red
"X" on the diagram, which is Exhibit 42-S.
The State claims the following from this
evidence: This knife was located 121 feet
south of where the cut boot was located.
State contends this knife was probably used
to cut said boot.
The defendant claims the following from
this evidence: That is, the knife matches
[defendant's] description of the knife used
by Lony Crosby. The knife was located south
of the campsite where Lony Crosby was shot.
[Defendant] testified that he threw the knife
to the south.
(T4. 603-04) (a complete copy of the pertinent transcript pages
is contained in Addendum A).

On appeal defendant alleges that

the trial court's "cure" was an inadequate "remedy" and that he
was unfairly prejudiced as a result (Br. of App. at 12).
1.

Defendant's Burden to Establish Prejudice

A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must show both that counsel rendered a
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deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that a
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's deficient
performance, the result of the trial would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v.
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d
401, 405 (Utah 1986).

A "[d]efendant must prove that specific,

identified acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance.

The claim may not be

speculative, but must be a demonstrative realityf.]M

Frame, 723

P.2d at 405. And, the deficient performance must be so
prejudicial as to "undermine confidence in the reliability of the
verdict."

Ibid.

If defendant fails to satisfy his burden of

showing that he was unfairly prejudiced as a result of the
alleged deficiency, this Court need not determine whether
counsel's performance in not introducing Lony's knife during the
course of trial was deficient.

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 119

(Utah 1989).
2. Defendant Was Not Prejudiced by Trial
Counsel's Performance
Instead of making the required, specific showing of
prejudice, defendant simply asserts, in conclusory fashion, that
if trial counsel had introduced the knife into evidence, "he
could have developed a sounder theory" of self defense, and
"enhanced [his] credibility!;.]" (Br. of App. 11). Defendant
levels these allegations with no discussion of the defense
actually presented by trial counsel, and does not articulate how
it was prejudicial beyond his speculative, unsupported assertion
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that trial counsel's failure to introduce the knife "compromised
his defense" (Br. of App. 13).
In an analogous case, the Utah Court of Appeals
recently recognized that a "failure to make a motion for
discovery does not constitute per se ineffective assistance"
where a review of the record demonstrates that counsel
"investigated the case through methods other than by a formal
discovery motion."

State v. Vigil, 197 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19

(Utah App. October 7, 1992).

Similarly, trial counsel's failure

to introduce the victim's knife into evidence during the course
of trial should not constitute per se ineffective assistance
because a review of the record demonstrates that trial counsel
adequately presented defendant's theory of self defense to the
jury.
In addition to defendant's testimony that he shot in
self defense (T4. 445-47), trial counsel introduced the testimony
of pathologist Edwin Sweeney, to the effect that the entrance
wounds on Lony's skull were not consistent with an execution type
killing, and that it was possible the wounds occurred while Lony
was "stepping forward and turning" (T4. 525-26).

In her cross-

examination of assistant medical examiner, Sharon Schnittker,
trial counsel similarly established that while it was "most
likely" that Lony's head was stationary at the time of the
shooting, Dr. Schnittker could not say so with "absolute
certainty" (T2. 227). Further, in her cross-examination of
Jennifer Bratt, trial counsel established that Lony was
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"extremely jealous" of Jennifer's relationship with defendant
(T2. 291), and that Lony had told Jennifer that he would "kill"
defendant "some day" (T2. 292).
Additionally, trial counsel used the fact that Lony's
knife was not in evidence to enhance defendant's credibility.
Specifically, the State introduced a knife found near the scene
of the shooting, but which did not match defendant's description
of the knife Lony had allegedly threatened him with (Tl. 88-91).
During her examination of defendant, trial counsel asked, "If you
were making up a lie, wouldn't it be easier just to say that you
took the knife with you?" (T3. 506). Defendant responded
affirmatively and also indicated that he did not know whether the
police had found the knife that he had described (T3. 506).
During her closing argument, trial counsel made the most of the
missing knife, asking the jury to consider that if it was true
defendant had lied about "crucial elements of what happened, why
didn't he lie and say that, yes, [the knife introduced by the
prosecutor] was [Lony's] knife?" (T4. 576).
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Lony's knife
was ultimately presented to the jury, along with defendant's
theory of its importance as corroborative of his version of the
homicide (T4. 604, see Addendum A ) .
In light of the foregoing, defendant's speculations on
appeal are simply insufficient to establish that the trial
court's cure was inadequate to remedy the minor, if any,
prejudice he suffered as a result of trial counsel's alleged
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deficiency.

Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. He has not shown how the

evidence amassed on either side might have been so altered by an
error of trial counsel that "the entire evidentiary picture"
would have been affected.
B.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.

The Prosecutor's Conduct was Appropriate

As for defendant's assertion that the prosecutor
concealed and withheld Lony's knife in violation of due process
(Br. of App. at 13-18), it is complete speculation, devoid of
record support and should be rejected.

See Koulis v. Standard

Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987) ("'This Court need
not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or
supported by, the record.'" (quoting Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978));

Utah R. App. P.

24 (e). See also State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984)
("This Court will not rule on matters outside the trial court
record.").
for review.

Moreover, the issue has not been properly preserved
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Utah 1989);

State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989) (grounds for an
objection must be specifically and distinctly stated in the trial
court before this Court will review such claim on appeal). As
noted in Part A, supra, trial counsel clarified that she was not
alleging that the State "hid" the knife from her:

"To that

extent I take responsibility" (T4. 594). Thus, the State
declines to address, and the Court should not consider,
defendant's assertion that the State was obligated to introduce
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the knife into evidence, or otherwise bring it to trial counsel's
attention (Br. of App. at 15).
POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT TRIAL
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO ALLEGED
IMPROPER EVIDENCE DEPRIVED HIM OF THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to
"[e]xclude [e]vidence . . . regarding [his] transportation of the
victim's corpse" (R. 62, 255, Transcript of final pretrial
hearing, July 2, 1990, [PT.] at 14). Defendant argued that the
evidence was neither relevant nor probative of his state of mind
at the time of the homicide, and that even if it was relevant,
the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any
probative value (R. 255-56, PT. 14-15).
Finding that the evidence was relevant "to the issue of
credibility," the trial court denied defendant's motion, "insofar
as it depends on relevance[.]" (R. 260, PT. 19). In addressing
the balancing test of rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, the Court
inquired what the nature of defendant's concerns were:
Is the only inflammatory portion that you're
claiming, . . .is, that the act happened,
and that he, [defendant], moved the body? Is
that the only inflammatory thing you are
claiming, or is it in [sic] your concern
about evidence [sic] about how he moved the
body and the condition of the body at the
time, and its decayed state? What is it
you're concerned about?
(R. 261, PT. 20). Trial counsel responded that they were only
"concerned about him having moved the body[,]" and "that the
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State [could] avoid that issue and have plenty of evidence to
proceed on" (R. 261, PT. 20).
The trial court then ruled as follows:
All right. I have previously determined
that the evidence in question is relevant.
And given the fact that what this case is
going to be about is self defense, the
credibility of [defendant] is highly
relevant. Rule 403 requires that in order
for evidence to be excluded, the probative
value must be substantial, and I emphasize
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice and other things.
However, in this case the unfair
prejudice is the only factor that's being
raised. I'm not persuaded at this time that
the probative value is substantially — and
again I emphasize substantially — outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.
If we were to get into the issue of some
gruesome aspects of the movement of the body,
my ruling would be otherwise. But what we
have here is merely a question of whether or
not the body was moved, and if so, was it
moved by [defendant].
And what did [defendant] — and what did
[defendant] say about that on prior
occasions. Because that's the limited issue,
the motion is denied.
(R. 262-63, PT. 21-22) (complete copies of trial counsel's motion
and the parties' argument thereon are contained in Addendum B).
A.

Defendant's Allegation of Deficient Performance

On appeal, defendant asserts that trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to object to gruesome evidence allegedly
admitted in violation of the court's ruling (Br. of App. at 1820).

Specifically, defendant complains that trial counsel should
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have objected to certain portions of the prosecutor's crossexamination of defendant concerning his movement of Lony's body:
Q. By this point you're up there in the
middle of the night and you have got Lony's
body, which has been decomposing for a month
and a half; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That's a terrible sight?

A.

I didn't look.

Q. You didn't look?
about it?
A.

Did you notice anything

Just sleeping bag and dirt.

Q. Well, there was a terrible smell, wasn't
there?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And it was in awful condition, wasn't it?

A.

Yes.

Q. To a point where it would almost be
falling apart at various limbs and that type
of thing, correct?
A.

Yes, it could have been.

Q.

Something might break apart?

A.

Probably could have, yes.
•

• •

Q. When you pulled him out, his foot broke
apart, didn't it?
A.

I don't know?

Q.

You don't remember?

A.

No, sir.
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Q. If his foot broke apart, you would be
sitting there holding the boot in your hand,
correct?
A.

I didn't pay no attention.

Q. You didn't pay no attention if you had
his foot in your hand?
A.

No.

Q. At that point it's possible, isn't it,
that you wouldn't want to put your hand in
that boot, correct?
A.

Yes, that would be.

Q. And so the likely thing to do may be to
take a knife, cut the back of the boot open
and take his foot out of the back by the
sock, correct?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

That wouldn't be the likely thing to do?

A.

I don't know.

I wouldn't do it.

Q. Okay. If you were to do that, then, you
could lay the foot down on top of him and
throw the boot away; is that correct?
A.

No, sir.

Q. Is it your testimony, then, that you
actually picked up a decomposing body that
had been there six weeks and carried it 100
yards down a hill covered with dirt?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. So you drive him up to the area west of
Utah Lake and you grab hold of this — not
this particular one but one of these on that
other sideboard [sic] — and pull him right
out of the truck, correct.
A.

Yes.
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Q. And everything that was there on top of
him came with it. Basically, the sleeping
bag and cans and trash and gloves and those
things were just basically junk in the back
of your dad's pickup, correct?
A.

Yes.

Q. It all just came sliding out and landed
on the ground. And what's the height of a
pickup, maybe two and a half, three feet?
Then you jump back in the truck and take off;
is that right?
A.

Yes.

Yes, sir.

(T3. 488-493) (a complete copy of the pertinent transcript pages
is contained in Addendum C).
Additionally, defendant claims it was ineffective for
trial counsel to stipulate to the following statement read by the
prosecutor:

"It's stipulated that when the remains of Lony

Crosby were located that his sock was found located on top of his
torso near the shoulders.

Inside that sock were the remains of

his right foot" (T4. 534).
Although the trial court cautioned the parties to avoid
the "gruesome aspects of the movement of the body" (R. 263, PT.
22, see Addendum B), it is not at all clear that the trial court
would have sustained an objection to the prosecutor's crossexamination of defendant on that subject, had such an objection
been made.

As recognized by the trial court, defendant's

credibility was a crucial issue at trial (R. 262, PT. 21, see
Addendum B).

The apparent purpose of the prosecutor's cross-

examination was to refute defendant's suggestion that he had not
lied concerning Lony's whereabouts after the homicide because he
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did not believe that Lony was dead (T3. 449, 454-58, 464), and
that he persisted in that belief even after he moved Lony's
decomposing corpse from the homicide scene to Utah Lake (T3. 47273, 484-486).

In order to demonstrate defendant's lack of

credibility concerning his refusal to believe that the homicide
had even occurred, it was both necessary and proper for the
prosecutor to confront defendant with the arguably gruesome
realities entailed in moving Lony's decomposing corpse.
Nonetheless, as noted in Point I, supra, if defendant fails to
satisfy his burden of showing that he was unfairly prejudiced by
the alleged deficiency on the part of trial counsel, this Court
need not determine whether counsel's performance was in fact
deficient.

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 119 (Utah 1989).

B. Defendant Has Not Shown How He was
Prejudiced by Trial Counsel's Performance
As in Point I of his brief, defendant again fails to
make the required, specific showing of prejudice.
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

State v.

Rather, defendant asserts,

in conclusory fashion, that trial counsel's failure to object to
allegedly improper questioning by the prosecutor "unfairly
prejudicfed] and inflamed the jury" (Br. of App. at 19).
Defendant does not articulate how trial counsel's failure to
object was prejudicial beyond his speculative and unsupported
assertions that

,f

[t]he only purpose the State had for eliciting

[the evidence] was to appeal to, and arouse the jury's sense of
horror," and "that the evidence was highly inflammatory in the
eyes of the jury" (Br. of App. 20). Defendant's assertion of
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prejudice fails to demonstrate that trial counsel's alleged
deficiency so affected "the entire evidentiary picture" as to
result in a different outcome.

Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
As noted previously, defendant's credibility was a
crucial issue at trial (R. 262, PT. 21, see Addendum B ) .
Accordingly, the State presented overwhelming evidence of the
lies defendant told to Lony's family, friends, and to law
enforcement officers concerning Lony's whereabouts after the
homicide (Tl. 33, T2. 246-47, 270-72, T3. 320-23, 342-44, 406-09,
402-03).

Additionally, even after admitting that he was

responsible for Lony's death, defendant lied to investigating
officers about where the homicide took place (Tl. 35-40, 71-79,
81-84, 188-92).

Further, the physical evidence does not support

defendant's allegations of self defense (T2. 202-42).

In light

of the foregoing, introduction of arguably gruesome testimony
concerning the realities entailed in moving Lony's decomposing
corpse would not have affected the jury's verdict.

Even without

evidence of defendant's lack of credibility concerning the
specific details of how he moved the corpse, the jury had
substantial evidence from which to infer that defendant was not
credible, and that his version of events was inconsistent with
the physical evidence.

Thus, defendant's allegation of prejudice

is speculative and merely revisits witness credibility issues
properly resolved at trial. As such, his argument does not merit
appellate relief.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, defendant's
conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <£ll

day of December, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

ssistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Manny Garcia, attorney for appellant, 431 South 300 East, #101
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, this JPI
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

1

J

verdict of guilty, to make a finding as to firearms, if

2

J

that is what the Court is making reference to.

3

I

* I
J

THE COURT:
recess.

Fine. Then we'll be in informal

Counsel, you can leave the courthouse as long as

you're within ten minutes and can be reached by telephone

6 J

and we have those telephone numbers.

7 I

in recess.

8

J

9 J

All right, we'll be

[Whereupon, court was in recess pending the
return of the jury.]

10

THE COURT:

The State of Utah versus Terry Hay.

11

Defendant is present, along with his counsel. Prosecution

11

is present.

13

about an hour.

14

that counsel for the defendant wanted to have the benefit

15

of the record for a motion.

16

PALACIOS:

17

mistrial, if I may state what occurred.

18

It is 2:40. The jury has been deliberating
I was notified by a knock on the door

Go ahead.

MS.

Your Honor, we would have a motion for

After the jury was excused I discovered that

19

Mr. Behrens had in his briefcase the knife with the black

20

handle and the red trim that was described by the

21 J

defendant during the course of his testimony.

22
23

THE COURT:
J

Just a minute.

Do you want to

unshackle the defendant?

24

TRANSPORTATION OFFICER:

25

MS. PALACIOS:

Fine.

I was advised that this was
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1

provided to me in the police reports.

2

can't dispute that at this point whether or not they were

3

in the police reports.

4

J

Quite frankly, I

If they were in the police

reports, then I believe that I would simply raise the
issue for appeal purposes on the grounds of ineffective

6 J

assistance of counsel, because in my obvious haste to

7

prepare for the trial —

8

prepared over the weekend —

9 J

that that knife existed, which would corroborate my

10

client's story.

11

I was sick for three days, and
I did not catch the fact

However, I do base the grounds on the motion

12 J

for mistrial on prosecutorial misconduct.

13

black knife that was entered into evidence, evidence to

14

which I objected as being irrelevant because it was not

15

the knife that was described by Mr. Hay.

16

allowed it in since it was found in the area.

17

that the prosecutor, having had access to that knife in

18

his briefcase and knowing that he had that knife, while

19

it may have been one thing to introduce that knife and

20

leave it up to me to do my job, I think it's quite

21 I

another thing to introduce another knife that he knew was

22 I

not the knife described, and was not relevant in the

23

case.

I

24
25

There was a

The Court
I think

I think it has the effect of misleading the
I

J ur Y# ancl I think it would have corroborated Mr. Hay's
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1

J

version that he had thrown the knife from that area and

2

J

that Mr. Crosby indeed had a knife, which was critical to

3 J

his self-defense.

4

knife offered, then maybe the knife would have been in

5

J

the bag or some other place.

6 I
7
8

Otherwise, if there had not been a

Those are the grounds upon which we make the
motion.

I

THE COURT: You stated all the reasons that you

9 I

believe constitute the significance of not having the

10

knife?

11

MS. PALACIOS:

12

THE COURT: Have you stated all the reasons you

I'm sorry?

13

believe have any significance for the motion based on

14

your not having access to the knife?

15

MS. PALACIOS:

I want to make it clear that the

16

knife —

17

that extent I take responsibility.

18

that I was ineffective not to do it. My concern is that

19 J

in raising and bringing in the knife, that was irrelevant

20

and knowing it was irrelevant, because they had the knife

21

in the briefcase, misled the jury. Had they introduced

22

the proper knife, or that knife, or both knives, because

23

J

I'm not alleging that they hid it from me.

To

As I said, I think

that was everything that they found there, for the jury

24

to fairly consider.

25

corroborates what Mr. Hay has said, and that is that he

The existence of the knife
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1

was attacked, the attacker fell, the knife fell, he

2

picked it up and threw it. And I think to that extent

3

we're arguing self-defense and where his credibility is

4

I

at issue.

J

In other words, there are things that he said

6 J

happened that they say didn't and to have something like

7 J

this is especially critical.

8

Mr. Scowcroft points out that we did not know

9

that the knife existed.

10

remember where it was in the record.

11

I

it was in the reports.

However, as I was —

I can't

I can't remember if

They have represented to me that

12

it was.

13

knife, and I missed out on that part.

14

just get back to the fact that this other knife was

15

introduced, which it clearly didn't have any relevance.

16
17

THE COURT:
J

Again, this is afterward.
I

However, again, I

Have you stated every reason now

MS. PALACI0S:

19

I wasn't shown the

for the significance of your motion?

18
20

I did not get the knife.

I hope I have, Your Honor.
I think it's really hard at

this juncture to tell what other possibilities or

21

arguments I might have been able to make with respect to

22 I

that knife, but misleading the jury

23

—

THE COURT: Well, I'm doing a lot of assuming.

24 J

I don't know what the purpose of putting that knife in

25

was.

If that knife —

I don't know if it was to try to
595

see if Terry would lie and say that was the knife and
then you say, wWe have got the real knife," and say you
have lied about that.
could have served*

I don't know what purpose that

And I think that I would have a much

stronger argument to make to the jury regarding that if I
could have shown that there was a knife that was tossed,
as Mr. Hay said there was. And I think —

I hope that's

everything.
THE COURT: Mr. Behrens?
MR. BEHRENS: We had a knife, a black knife
with a red handle here in evidence.

It was being held in

the Murray Police Department evidence room.
have —

I did not

oh, let me back up.
My understanding is that that knife was found

down in that area during one of the searches in August or
September and given to the Sanpete County Sheriff's
Department.
My understanding from Det. Anderson was that he
received it from the Sanpete County Sheriff's Department.
I didn't think I could lay a foundation as to where that
knife was found without having somebody who found it here
in court to testify.

I didn't think that I could get it

in through Det. Anderson simply because he was given that
knife by someone else.
I don't have it in front of me.

I know that
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1

knife is referred to in at least one or two police

2

reports, and I'm sure we displayed this in discovery,

3

I admitted the other knife because I knew there

4

was evidence and testimony indicating that both Terry and

5

Lony had taken two knives apiece up there, and I didn't

6

want to be — when I had Det. Anderson on the stand, I

7

didn't want to be hiding a knife that I knew I could get

8

in through him.

9

shells and the knife that were found there.

10

That's what I had him testify to, the

If I thought I could have gotten it in —

and

11

maybe you would have let me —

12

would have admitted it through him then, but he couldn't

13

testify as to where it was found, because he did not find

14

it.

15 I

in hindsight, I'm sure I

THE COURT: Why don't we have a stipulation and

16

bring the jury back in and mark it and tell them?

17

can't have it both ways. You either want it in or want

18

it out, and I don't think there's been anything corrupted

19

in their deliberations. We can send it to them now with

20 I

a stipulation.

21

MS. PALACIOS:

You

I'm not trying to have things

22

both ways, Judge. Let me —

23 J

motion for mistrial ought to be granted.

24 I

Court is going to deny my motion, then I would prefer

25 I

that the matter be cured in that manner.

I actually think that the
However, if the
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1 I
2

I

THE COURT: Well, I won't grant the motion for
mistrial unless there's good ground for it. And if

3 J

there's a way to cure things, there's not good ground for

4

I

a mistrial.

5

I

MR. MACDOUGALL:

There are a couple of problems

6 I

with trying to cure it.

7 J

inf they're being given another piece of evidence which

® J

obviously has significance.

9 I

the jury what the significance of that is.

10 J

suppose we can get into the business of telling the jury

11

which side had the knife and which side is producing the

12

knife.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. MACDOUGALL:

If we're bringing the jury back

The other side is arguing to
I don't

No.
It's looking as though

15

somebody was hiding something from the jury without any

16

explanation.

17

give them a piece of evidence that unintentionally may

18

cut either way or no way without any input as to how this

19 I

all came about.

20

J

11

MS. PALACIOS: That's my concern.
THE COURT: Wait a minute. We need to take out

22
23

I kind of have a concern about trying to

of this picture for now any reflection upon any of us as
I

to why it didn't come in# because the purpose now is to

24 I

cure things. We can clean up any perceived damage to the

25

system that the system has, except something they should
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1
2

have had# and I'm not suggesting that did occur.
J

not what I'm worried about at this time.

3
4

That's

What I am worried about at this time is#
J

assuming there's a problem, we have an opportunity to
rectify it, and I think we ought to take that

6

I

opportunity.

7

J

think for 15 minutes or so about how you would use such

8
9

evidence if it came in, and then to have you write out
J

10 I
11

One way of doing it is for each of you to

\

what you believe the significance of it is. And then if
we

could have a stipulation as to what it is, who found

it, or at least what agency found it, approximately when

12 I

and where, and then to just have counsel, in a very

13 J

dispassionate way, read to the jury their statement that
everybody has seen before as to what significance that

15 |

particular counsel believes should be attributed to the

16

knife, which will give you the opportunity to indicate to

I

17

Ms. Palacios that it's a point of consistency.

IS J

What do you believe?

19

MR. MACDOUGALL:

I

It bothers me there's still

20

the inference that somebody was hiding something from the

21 I

jury, and that's not the case.

22 J

jury, I would think that the State hid that knife from

23

us, and now it's come up and it's now being offered to us

24 I

and we're being toldmthat there's a piece of evidence

25

that was being concealed from us.,f

I

If I were sitting on that
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1

I

2

I

And that, I don't think, they're entitled to
draw that inference from what occurred.

I'm certain that

3 I

there's no real way to purge that at this point.

4 J

we can talk it over and see if there's any way to talk it

5

over.

J

6

MS. PALACIOS:

7 J
8

I guess

I'm willing to talk it over and

try to cure it.

J

THE COURT: We need to do that.

I see your

9 I

point on that.

10

it's a matter that they'll take sanctions in their

11

verdict against the State for what they perceive is the

12

State's hiding of evidence.

13
14

You're saying it's not a matter of ego,

All right.
1

15

Figure it out.

this. We'll be in recess.

I want to cure

I'll expect to hear from you

in five or six minutes.

16

[Whereupon, court continued in recess at 2:50

17

to 3:25 p.m.]

18 J

THE COURT:

Defendant is present, counsel are

19 J

present.

20

Defendant is present, along with his counsel, counsel for

21 J

the prosecution is here, the jury is not.

22 J

the record to see if we have a solution to the problem.

23

This is State of Utah versus Terry Hay.

MR. BEHRENS:

I think we do.

We're back on

I think it's

24 J

agreeable to the parties that the Court will read a

25

statement to the jury which has been typed up here and
I
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1

then the State and defense have also typed up what they

2

have entitled State's Statement of Significance and

3

Defense Statement of Significance and would ask the Court

4

to read that to the jury.

5

J

Contained in the explanation to the jury is a

6

description of the knife, and we have marked it as

7

State's Exhibit 43. We have also marked a diagram, which

8

is marked as State's Exhibit 42, on which there's a red

9

ff tf

10

was found in the instructions to the jury.

x

11

and that's described as the location where the knife

THE COURT: There's distances marked on that

12

photographic exhibit?

13

MR. BEHRENS: There are, Your Honor.

14

THE COURT: All right. And can you recall that

15

exhibit corresponds, at least generally, to the two

16

written ones that are already in evidence, if they want

17

I

to compare them?

18 J
19

MR. BEHRENS:

It does. As a matter of fact,

the one might have made this particular exhibit.

20

THE COURT:

21 J

MS. PALACIOS: That's the agreement we have

22

come to with respect to that.

23

THE COURT: All right. And assuming, without

24 I
25

Okay.

I

conceding, Mr. Behrens, that there was a problem raised
b

Y the motion, is it your belief this rectifies it?
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1

MR. BEHRENS:

2

THE COURT: Ms. Palacios?

3 J

MS. PALACIOS: Well, Your Honor, to be quite

I believe it does, Your Honor.

4

I

frank, I don't think it does, but given the opportunity

5

J

to attempt to cure it, since the Court is not inclined to

6 I

grant my motion, I'm not going to pass up the

7

opportunity.

I

8

THE COURT: All right. What is it that you

9 I
10
11

don't think it cures?
MS. PALACIOS: Well, I just think that it would

I

have been a lot more effective if I could have asked

12

Terry to identify it, if I could have argued and gone on

13 J

and on about the credibility, just to that extent.

14

THE COURT: Well, let me tell you.

No one is

15 J

entitled to a perfect trial.

16

I

fair trial. And in fact the way this has occurred may

17

J

have been much more effective for your client than any

Everyone is entitled to a

18 J

other way.

19 I

something they never expected, either manna from heaven

20

or elsewhere, and I think it could well be more effective

21 I

in your behalf because of the stipulation of the parties

22

and my consideration of it.

23

The jury is going to look upon it as

Court denies the motion for a new trial.

I'm

24 I

going to bring the jury in at this time and proceed as

25

indicated.

I
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1

[Whereupon, the jury returned to the

2
3

courtroom.]
I

4

THE COURT:

The record should indicate that the

jury is now present.
Members of the jury, we're going to do

6

something a little bit out of the ordinary.

7

to, at this time, receive Exhibits 42 and 43.

8

knife; 42 is a map of the area of search, or the area

9 I

that we have been talking about in Sanpete County, with a

10

designation of 42 on the map, with a red flXfl in the lower

11

left-hand side of the map indicating where the knife,

12

Exhibit 43, was found.

13

I'm going
43 is a

There was a knife in existence and neither

14

party established foundation for its admissibility into

15

evidence during the trial proper.

16

agreed, however, that the knife should be admitted at

17

J

Both parties have

this time for consideration by the jury in its

18

deliberations.

19

in red, found in late August or early September 1989, and

20

It's a knife with a black handle trimmed

J

marked as Exhibit 43-S by a member of the Sanpete Search

21 J

and Rescue organization, and found, as I indicated, at a

22

place designated by the red ,fX,f on the diagram, which is

23

Exhibit 42-S.

24 I
25

I

The State claims the following from this
evidence:

This knife was located 121 feet south of where
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1

the cut boot was located.

2

probably used to cut said boot.

3

State contends this knife was

The defendant claims the following from this

4

J

evidence:

5

J

description of the knife used by Lony Crosby•

That is, the knife matches Terry Hay's
The knife

6 I

was located south of the campsite where Lony Crosby was

7 I

shot.

8

south.

Terry Hay testified that he threw the knife to the

9 I

Mr. Unsworth, would you take this evidence and

10

J

treat it like the other evidence, and get it into the

11

J

jury room?

We're going to re-sequester you.

We brought

12

you in for a little breath of fresh air, and now we'll

13

send you back to where we found you and you will again be

14

sequestered.

15

Go ahead and take the jury, Mr. Unsworth.

16

[Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.]

17

THE COURT: All right.

The record should

18 1

indicate that the jury is now gone.

19

you just keep the defendant in the holding cell for 15

20

J

I would suggest that

minutes, in case there's any reaction from this or we get

21 J

any questions. And if, after 15 minutes, you haven't

22 J

heard anything from us, then I would just follow your

23

usual practice, which I assume is down the elevator

J

24 I
25

I

TRANSPORTATION OFFICER:

—

We're only 30 feet

from the elevator, even down in the jail.
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THE COURT:

I just don't want him sitting

there with the cuffs biting into him while he is listening
to a motion*
All right. Mr. Scowcroft.
MR. SCOWCROFT:

Thank you,

Your Honor.

Your Honor/ we have made a motion to exclude evidence
at the trial regarding allegations that Mr. hay transported
the victim's remains approximately five to six weeks
after the homicide.
There are two grounds for this. First of all*
we would argue that evidence of that nature is not relevant
to the issues that need to be determined in this case.
That's under Rule 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
The reason it isn't relevant/ Your Honor/ is that we
have stipulated to a number of evidentiary issues in
this case.

First of all/ we have stipulated to the site

of the homicide.
the homicide.

Second/ Terry has admitted having committed]

So I think we would all agree here that

what we are really basically —

the only real issue for

the jury to determine here is his state of mind.

We

intend to raise a defense of justification/ that being
self defense.
Because this act of moving the victim's remains
is alleged to have occurred five or six weeks after the
homicide/ it is simply not probative of his state of
14

n/iAPr

mind when the homicide took place five or six weeks earlier.
If anything/ I would argue it reflects his state of mind
when he moved the remains.
Our second argument/ Your Honor/ is that if
the court finds that this evidence is at all relevant
the danger of prejudice/ confusion and misleading of
the jury substantially outweighs any probative value
that the evidence has. That comes under Rule 403 of
the Rules of Evidence.

The reason/ Your Honor/ is that

it's inflammatory/ it's a gruesome act.

For that reason/

if it is relevant^ and we don't believe it is relevant/
there is substantial danger that the jury will be misled
and will form an attitude toward Terry that has really
nothing to do with the criminal charge here/ that being
homicide.
We cited a case/ Your Honor/ State v. Mauer
and I think maybe the court — we submitted the case
and I believe the court —
THE COURT:

I tried it the second time.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes.
talk a lot about that.
did.

So I don't need to

But a couple of things that Mauer

The Mauer court recognized that a — well/ in that

case that Mr. Mauer's state of mind when he wrote the
letter/ parts of which were excluded under Rule 403/
is independent and not necessarily probative of his state
15

/inoftc

of mind when the homicide occurred.
This is a similar case.

Same charge* similar

defense/ and I would argue on the basis of Mauer that
the letter in the Mauer case/ that is* the speech of
the defendant was certainly more probative of his state
of mind in relation to the criminal charge than these
alleged acts are here. And we would argue/ on the basis
of Mauer that if that evidence was excludable/ then this
evidence ought to excludable here.
THE COURT: Mr. Behrens.
MR. BEHRENS: Well/ the evidence in this
case would show that the alleged homicide occurred on
August 1st of '89/ and the remains were discovered on
December 31 of 1989.

In that five month period of time

the State would allege and produce witnesses to show
that the defendant made various statements as to what
happened to the victim* and we will also show conduct
which was inconsistent with the self defense theory that's
been raised.
It's our impression that the defendant went
and moved the remains approximately three weeks after
the homicide* and there is evidence to show that the
condition of the remains was very decayed/ and it is
a very gruesome act.

I think the jury is entitled to

hear/ first of all/ the explanation of how these remains
16

iwlO^w

came to be in Utah County, to begin with* because that's
going to come out.

That's how this whole case was discovered

in the first place/ and to what lengths the defendant
was willing to go to cover up the murder* the homicide*
and also that he is attempting to conceal evidence of
that homicide/ all of which would be inconsistent with
his defense of self defense.
It would be inconsistent with a claim of self
defense.
THE COURT:
to that effect?

Do you have some case law

It seems to me that it's ambiguous/

that act/ at least as to the charge.

I'm having some

difficulty understanding the relevance of his movement
of the remains and how that reflects upon the self defense
theory.
MR. BEHRENS:
his credibility.

Because it reflects upon

Initially when he was questioned on

this he made a statement that the homicide occurred in
Murray* and that he moved the body to Utah Lake/ and
now we have a stipulation that the homicide occurred
in Sanpete County/ and again the body was still moved
to Utah Lake.
We have to be able to explain how the body
was moved/ and it's inconsistent with the statements
he's already made.
17

00258

He has made a number of —

claimed a number

of different versions as to what happened to the victim
in this case/ this being one of them.

I think we are

entitled to present that to attack his credibility.
THE COURT:

Does your witness intend to

testify?
MS. PALACIOS: Mr. Hay? Yes.
THE COURT: What about that/ Mr. Scoweroft?
MR. SCOWCROFT:
evidence has to come out.

I still don't think this

I think some inconsistent

statements may come out if he takes the stand/ but I
don't think it's correct to suggest that this evidence
has to come out.
THE COURT: Well/ no.

I'm sayingi isn't

it relevant as to his credibility/ and that is# that
if he testifies/ then they can cross examine him about
his propensity to tell the truth.
MR. SCOWCROFT:
arily so/ Your Honor.

I don't think that's necess-

I think there are other possible

explanations for that.
For one thing/ a person experiencing denial
and even remorse in actions of this kind could be consistent
with those types of —

with that type of conduct/ rather

than with attempting to cover it up or lie.

So I think

there are other —
18
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1

THE COURT:

I'm not suggesting/ at least

2

right now/ that his actual movement of the body is

3

inconsistent with his defense of self defense.

4

not what I'm asking now*

5

What I am asking:

That's

Isn't it relevant to the

6

issue of credibility that he told —

7

story about the body* how it got to wherever it got*

3

and they have evidence that there is a different story

9

indicating that he didn't tell the truth?

10

allegedly told one

And perhaps if he's not telling the truth then,

11

perhaps he is not telling the truth on the stand?

12

about that?

13

MR. SCOWCROFT:

What

I think that could be

14

so# and they are entitled to bring those things out.

15

However/ I think we are in a situation where we have to

15

balance Mr. Hay's rights to a fair trial under these

17

rules.

|g

THE COURT:

On the basis of what you just

19

indicated to me/ the motion/ insofar as it depends on

20

relevance/ is denied.

2i

Now/ we need to address 403.

How do you intend,

22

Mr. Behrens/ if the defendant takes the stand and if

21

he testifies in such a way that it's appropriate for

24

you to cross examine him as to the different stories

25 I he told* it seems to me that we can run into a 403 problem
19

1

by the manner in which you proceed on that.

2

Do you intend to just get into the issues that

3

he moved the body/ period/ without any other grisly details

4

of how he did it/ or anything like that?

5 I

MR. BEHRENS:

In our case-in-chief*

6

absolutely* because there's evidence found in Sanpete

7

County that the act of homicide occurred there* and that

8

the body was buried there and then moved from there later

9

on

10

As far as actually how it was accomplished/

11

or what not/ we don't have specific evidence as to that.

12

I have got to go into that on cross examination.

13

THE COURT:

Is the only inflammatory portion

14

that you're claiming/ Mr. Scowcroft* and that is* that

15

the act happened* and that he/ Mr. Hay* moved the body?

Ig

Is that the only inflammatory thing you are claiming/

17

or is it in your concern about evidence about how he

18

moved the body and the condition of the body at the time*

19

and its decayed state?

20
2i

What is it you're concerned about?

MR. SCOWCROFT:

We are concerned about

him having moved the body.

22

THE COURT:

Period.

2|

MR. SCOWCROFT:

Right.

We think that

24

the State can avoid that issue and have plenty of evidence

25

to proceed on* has many statements from Mr. Hay which
20

1

I think the State may argue are inconsistent.

2

I do not think this is going to prejudice the

3

State1s case/ and I think, as I said before/ we just

4

have to balance the rights here.

5

has been prejudiced* and I think that Mr. Hay would be*

6

by bringing in evidence that bones were found in different

7

locations.

g

case.

9

I don't think the State

That's just not necessary to prove their

And of course that's a consequence of the body

fO

having been moved.

11

has been moved* then I believe we need to exclude evidence

12

that bones were found in different places.

13

If we exclude evidence that the body

I don't understand how that would prejudice

14

the State's case.

15

effect of denying the State an opportunity to introduce

15

into evidence prior inconsistent statements* if that

17

is their intent.

18

And I don't think it would have the

THE COURT:

All right.

I have previously

19

determined that the evidence in question is relevant.

20

And given the fact that what this case is going to be

21

about is self defense* the credibility of Mr. Hay is

22

not only relevant* but it is highly relevant.

2|

requires that in order for evidence to be excluded* the

24

probative value must be substantial* and I emphasize

25

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice

Rule 403

21

and other things.
However* in this case the unfair prejudice
is the only factor that's being raised.

I'm not persuaded

at this time that the probative value is substantially
—

and again I emphasize substantially —

outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice.
If we were to get into the issue of some gruesome
aspects of the movement of the body* my ruling would
be otherwise.

But what we have here is merely a question

of whether or not the body was moved/ and if so# was
it moved by Mr. Hay.
And what did Mr. Hay —

and what did Mr. Hay

say about that on prior occasions.

Because that's the

limited issue/ the motion is denied.
MR. SCOWCROFT:
MS. PALACIOS:

Thank you/ Your Honor.
That's all we have at this

time.
THE COURT:
we are going to start.
me/ 9:00 o'clock a.m.
start on Monday.

Let's figure out what time

We will start at 9:00 p.m.

Excuse

I thought we would get an early

9:00 o'clock a.m.

MR. SCOWCROFT:
Your Honor/ I wanted to —

There is one other matter/

since Mr. Behrens and Mr.

McDougal are here/ we wanted to provide Terry with some
other books to read in the jail. My understanding of
22

nn?B3

ADDENDUM C

A.

No, sir.

Q.

There was still parts of him showing?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you say it was about six weeks later.

Could it have been as short as three to four weeks
later?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

You think it was about a month and a half?

A.

(Witness nods head indicating affirmative.)

Q.

By this point you're up there in the middle

of the night and you have got Lony's body, which has
been decomposing for a month and a half; is that
correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That's a terrible sight?

A.

I didn't look.

Q.

You didn't look?

Did you notice anything

about it?
A.

Just sleeping bag and dirt.

Q.

Well, there was a terrible smell, wasn't

there?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And it was in an awful condition, wasn't it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

To a point where it would almost be falling
488

I

apart at various limbs and that type of thing, correct?

2

A.

Yes, it could have been.

3

Q.

Something might break apart?

4

A.

Probably could have, yes.

5

Q.

Okay.

1

When you went to retrieve his body,

6

you bent down to pull it out of the hole, you grabbed

7

his heels and you tried to pull him out, didn't you?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Is that what happened?

10

A.

Then I picked him up, yes.

11

Q.

When you pulled him out, his foot broke

12

apart, didn't it?

13

A.

I don't know.

14

Q.

You don't remember?

15

A.

No, sir.

16

Q.

If his foot broke apart, you would be sitting

17

there holding the boot in your hand, correct?

18

A.

I didn't pay no attention.

19

Q.

You didn't pay no attention if you had his

20

foot in your hand?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

At that point it's possible, isn't it, that

23

you wouldn't want to put your hand in that boot,

24

correct?

25

A.

Yes, that would be.
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Q.

And so the likely thing to do may be to take

a knife, cut the back of the boot open and take his
foot out of the back by the sock, correct?
A.

No, sir*

Q.

That wouldn't be the likely thing to do?

A.

I don't know.

Q.

Okay.

I wouldn't do it.

If you were to do that, then, you

could lay the foot down on top of him and throw the
boot away; is that correct?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

These sideboards belonged to your father's

truck, right?
A.

Yes, they do.

Q.

And he used them to haul firewood primarily,

to extend the sides of the pickup?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And when you drove down there, they were up

so that firewood and things could be put in the truck;
is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And when you backed up the truck, possibly

you went up and lopked at the body and discovered what
condition it was, but you needed some type of a gurney
or structure to get him off there, didn't you?
A*

No, sir.
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1

Q.

Is it your testimony, then, that you actually

2 J

picked up a decomposing body that had been there six

3

weeks and carried it 100 yards down a hill covered with

4

dirt?

5

I

6

A,

Yes# sir,

Q.

Let me throw you a hypothetical then.

Would

7

it have been easier to knock —

let me ask you this:

8

When they're put together right, these are all stapled

9

together, right, at right angles like that?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Would it have been easier to knock one of the

12

long ones off, break it apart and take it up the hill,

13

then lay the sleeping bag on top of it?

14

have been easier?

Wouldn't that

15

A.

I don't know.

16 I

Q.

Well, you indicate you carried it down the

17

hill.

Would it have been easier to have the sleeping

18

bag laying on top of that and drag him down by hanging

19

onto something like this, than it was to carry his body

20 I

on a sleeping bag covered with dirt 100 yards down that

21

hill?

That could have been easier, wouldn't it?

22

A.

It could have.

23

Q.

Okay.

24 I
25

slide it into the back of the truck, right?
A.

I

And it would have made it easier to

Possibly.
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1

Q.

2

these two sideboards on top; is that correct?

3
4

When you got him into the truck, you threw

I

A.

Yes.

Q.

But when you got down there, all three of

5

them were intact together. That's what you just

6 I

testified to; is that right?

7

I

8

9 I

A.

Yes.

Q.

So at some point you must have broken off

that other long one from these two, correct?

10 I

A.

Yes, sir.

11

Q.

You did that to use it as a gurney?

12 I

A.

I don't know, sir.

13 \

Q.

So you drive him up to the area west of Utah

14

J

Lake and you grab hold of this —

not this particular

15 I

one but one of these on that other sideboard —

16

pull him right out of the truck, correct?

and

17

A.

Yes.

18 J

Q#

And everything that was there on top of him

19

I

came with it. Basically, the sleeping bag and cans and
trash and gloves and those things were just basically

21 J

junk in the back of your dad's pickup, correct?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

It all just came sliding out and landed on

24

the ground.

25

two and a half, three feet?

And what's the height of a pickup, maybe
Then you jump back in the
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1

truck and take off; is that right?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Okay.

Yes, sir.

4

May I have a moment, please, Your Honor?

5

THE COURT: Yes.

6

Q.

7
8

(By Mr. Behrens)

your trip to Wales.
I

9

Now, let's go back before

Basically, you and Lony and

Jennifer were all good friends and you saw each other
many times a week; is that right?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And Jennifer and Lony would frequently break

12 I

up, sometimes once or twice a week for a couple days at

13

a time; is that right?

14

A.

Yes.

15 J

Q.

Every time she broke up, she would come
,f

16

running to you and say,

0h, he treats me too bad.

I

17

hate it when he does this and that," and you would feel

18

sorry for her, right?

19 J

you would go out, go to movies, or go bum around, or go

20

to the mall and stuff like that?

Every time that would happen,

21

A.

Not every time, no.

22 J

Q.

Some of the times then, maybe not every time?

23 I

And at times you would tell Jennifer that you loved

24 I

her, that you cared .about her; is that correct?

25 I
I

A.

I just told her I felt sorry for her.
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